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Introduction
Youth violence is mostly interpreted as deviant behavior and an individual or collective response to marginalization and discrimination (Heitmeyer and Legge 2008) . 1 Nevertheless, most young people do not turn to violent behavior, even in high-risk contexts, a fact that has only recently obtained more attention (Christiansen et al. 2006) . 2 (2010) . All these projects and the many discussions were important in the development of the broader conceptual and regional perspective of the topic of this article. My thanks go to all involved in these projects, while any shortcomings and faults are my responsibility.
2 The different risk factors for youth becoming violent have been discussed in different strands of literature. On gangs see Hagedorn (2007 Hagedorn ( , 2008 ; on youth in armed groups Dowdney (2005) ; on youth in armed conflict see Brett and Specht (2004) among others. risk contexts for youth violence as most war-torn societies are demographically very young or even have a youth bulge. 3 At the same time, youth issues do not figure prominently on national and international agendas for postwar or postconflict contexts. While there are programs that target former child soldiers, most policies do not have specifically youth-oriented interventions. 4 On the contrary, in many postwar societies youths are perceived as "troublemakers" (McEvoy-Levy 2006) or a security problem (Oettler 2011 ).
Most of the existing research on youth violence focuses either on young people's motivation to commit violence, on society's response to violent behavior or on the neglect of youthspecific needs in postwar contexts. 5 What remains under-researched is the interaction between youth and society and the specific mechanisms influencing youth behavior. This article addresses some of the related issues and attempts to explain the variation in youth violence across different contexts of high structural risk. It therefore analyzes the transitions of young people into adult society, identifying not only the different risk factors but also the agency of young people and society in trying to cope with and overcome obstacles on the pathway to adulthood. Socialization is the main starting point as it is the central interface between youth and adult society across the globe, producing expectations (for young people and adult society) about necessary status passages. In postwar contexts young people have grown up with and are socialized through various experiences of war and violence. At the individual as well as at the collective level this is one of the major risk factors for violent behavior (Brett and Specht 2004; Dowdney 2005) . At the same time, the transition into adulthood in postwar contexts is shaped by conditions of rapid social change (for example, urbanization) after the formal end of war. Transitions to adulthood in these contexts pose challenges for young people as well as for adult society and mirror society's capacity or inability to manage change. Transitions into adulthood are thus an interesting indicator for more general developments in postwar societies.
In order to develop this argument, the first section of this paper introduces the concept of socialization as the main interface between youth and adult society. 6 Socialization sources in-3 A youth bulge is a product of demographic change with decreasing mortality and fertility rates; it exists when the age group between age 15 and 24 represents more than 20 percent of the population, with the current global average being 17 percent. The writings of Cincotta et al. (2003) , Fuller (1995) , and Huntington (1997) , among others, have made popular the "youth bulge thesis" in security studies, which claims that youth bulges increase the risk of violent conflict. Regarding conflict, there is no linear relationship, but there is some evidence that an excess of young males without prospects for the future might increase violence or at least lead to conflict-prone environments. Urdal (2006) explains that youth bulges do not seem to be related to largescale wars but rather to less organized forms of low-intensity political and intrastate violence. See also Barakat and Urdal (2009) .
4 See Kemper (2005) , McEvoy-Levy (2008) , Schwartz (2010) .
5 On motivation see literature in FN 1; on response see Cunningham et al. (2008) , Hagedorn (2007) , Klein and Maxson (2006) , Peetz (2010) ; on youth needs see FN 4.
6 On socialization see Arnett and Galambos (2003) , Arnett and Taber (1994) , Arnett (1995) The empirical evidence relies on two case studies carried out in Guatemala and Cambodia, two postwar societies with similar risk factors but different levels of youth violence. 7 The conclusion identifies two different patterns of youth-society relations based on the modes of war termination and reconstruction and identifies important questions for future research.
Socialization -The Main Interface between Youth and Adult Society
While the concept of youth is highly context specific, there are universal patterns too. 8 Across the globe, youths' transition to adulthood is marked by three interrelated status passages:
family formation, economic independence and political citizenship. While these transitions are quite universal, their specific form and the overall relationship between youth and adult society varies according to the cultural, temporal and historical context. Youth is different (generally shorter) for young women than for their male peers given that their status as youth comes to an end with the first pregnancy as in most societies motherhood remains the most important marker of female adulthood. Urban youth confront different challenges than those growing up in rural settings; access to resources is different according to social status; and the possibilities for political participation vary across regimes or juridical codes. 9
The central interface for youths' transition into adulthood is socialization: introducing and familiarizing children and youth with existing rules, values and norms (Arnett 1995;  7 On the conceptual framework on socialization and status passages see Kurtenbach (2012) . On the case studies see Hensengerth (2008a Hensengerth ( , 2008b , Kurtenbach and Hensengerth (2010) , Kurtenbach (2008a Kurtenbach ( , 2008b Kurtenbach ( , 2008c .
8 The beginning of youth is mostly characterized by the end of primary education, the physical process of maturing to woman or man (puberty), and growing independence from the family. This concerns mostly the age cohorts between childhood and the age of 18, the international threshold for the implementation of childprotection norms. (Dawson et al. 1973: 27) . As a consequence, socialization has a certain conservative bias.
However, young people are not just passive objects; socialization is an active process grounded in social practices "that may be habitual insofar as they are long lasting and become integral to one's identity" (Youniss and Yates 1999: 8 (Arnett 1995: 620-621) . Autonomous peer groups lacking supervision or control by elders often provoke adults' skepticism, criticism or even rejection of youth. Claims that (mostly male) youth misbehave and are "out of control" have been made in different historical contexts and all over the world:
In many cities throughout the world, there is a growing intolerance of young people in the public arena. They are widely viewed as undesirable in the streets and shops, particularly when they are in groups. Public spaces are seen to be "owned" by adults, with young people's presence representing an unwanted intrusion. (WYR 2003: 274) Independently of their specific structure, socialization processes produce expectations regarding the status passages into adulthood. There is an intimate relationship between the socialization of youth and the social and political context, with the latter affecting processes as well as opportunities for the transition into adulthood. Socialization processes can provide In postwar societies socialization is greatly influenced by personal experiences of violence. 12 If someone is a victim of, a witness to or a perpetrator of violence in childhood and adolescence, this has consequences at the individual as well as at the collective level; it will influence status passages, the development of identity patterns, and forms of social organization with peers. For a youth whose identity has been shaped by the experience of violence and a lack of even rudimentary forms of security, the development of a stable personality will be much more difficult than it would be in a nonviolent environment. 13 The necessities of day-to-day survival create a permanent situation of uncertainty for adults as well as for youths, with few or no models for nonviolent problem solving and other constructive behavior. As Mamphela Ramphele (2002: 28) notes, "The demands of survival limit people to basic functions of existence that permit little scope for imagining a different future. It is when the conditions of life are seen to be amenable to human control and influence that risk management takes over fatalism." 14
The experience of violence impacts heavily on primary socialization institutions (family, kin, neighborhoods). While the experience of violence might come to an end with the termination of war, the legacy of war and violence may persist for much longer. At the individual level traumatization is a case in point; at the collective level group solidarities and identities may be shaped through the experience of war (veterans are an example here); and last not least, formal and informal institutions of secondary socialization may have survived but can also be destroyed or changed. As a consequence, established transitions into adulthood in postwar societies will be difficult to make and new rites of passage will still need to be developed or accepted. Seen from a conflict perspective, these contexts provide ample room for intergenerational conflict as well as for the use of violence in the performance of transitions.
The following section analyzes the challenges of the transitions from school to work and into political citizenship, focusing on similarities and differences in postwar Guatemala and Cambodia.
11 On postwar contexts and youth see Kurtenbach (2008a Kurtenbach ( , 2008d .
12 For the impact of armed conflict on children and youth see Blattman (2009 ), Hart (2008 , Machel ( , 2001 ).
13 In different contexts research has emphasized the importance of weapons use or gang membership for getting approval and respect, as well as for the construction of subcultural identities and/or masculine identities (Barker 2005; Hagedorn 2008; Keen 2002 ).
14 That this is a factor of major importance can be seen in the differences in the perception of the future among postwar youth in Burundi and Rwanda ( Two main status passages -towards economic independence and towards political citizenship -are important across different contexts and highly interrelated. While family formation is a third global status passage, in most societies economic independence or at least the acquisition of a certain level of economic resources (to establish an independent household or to pay for a dowry or marriage) is a precondition for family formation (Mensch et al. 2005) . At the same time, economic opportunities and the legal frameworks for family formation depend on patterns of political citizenship and the possibilities for participation. The following analysis thus focuses on economic independence and political citizenship, identifying the specific challenges of achieving such status in postwar contexts and the role of violence in doing so. 17 Although the empirical evidence used here comes from Guatemala and Cambodia, a variety of case studies also point in a similar direction.
Economic Independence
While the formal termination of war is mostly seen to result in an increase in opportunities, young people on the ground often face extreme problems in their transitions to economic independence due to the long-term impacts of war and violence. A recent UNESCO report 18 refers to the destruction of schools and attacks on teachers as direct negative impacts of war on education, along with displacement and forced migration. Armed conflicts also reduce general public funding for education as military expenditures are given priority. As a result there is a significant loss in years of schooling and a reversal (or at least reduced progress) in literacy and other skills necessary for the school-to-work transition. (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) , and the urban population was forced to resettle in the rural areas. Cambodians lost 2.3 years from the average duration of schooling between 1965 and 1978, and this average had only been 3.3 years at the start of the conflict (UNESCO 2011: 136) . While the public education system was reconstructed after the Vietnamese invasion in 1979, its territorial coverage and quality were low due to Cambodia's international isolation. Low levels of adult literacy even today are a mirror of educational loss due to violence. In 2000 the average number of years of schooling in Cambodia had increased just one year over that at the start of conflict (ILO 2009: 23) . In Guatemala the war increased disparities in education between the indigenous and the nonindigenous populations, as well as between the indigenous populations in war-affected and non-waraffected areas (UNESCO 2011: 136) . As a consequence, youth in both societies lack the educational skills essential for a successful school-to-work transition and economic independence.
The related problems are obvious in the data on youth participation in the labor market.
An ILO report on the effects of the financial crisis on Cambodia (ILO 2009: 23) Employers and Business Associations (CAMFEBA), the low absorption rate is due to a mismatch between the supply and demand in skills because of the lack of data and information on the labour market. The education attainment of the youth population is low for both male and female, with less than 5% having completed secondary education … Combining low education with low skills and little experience, they are likely to face difficulties in finding off-farm jobs and will typically be the first group of workers retrenched during economic hard time [sic] .
The situation for most Guatemalan youth is not much better. Thirty-five percent of 15-yearolds were illiterate when the war ended in 1995 (Walter 2000: 17) ; 44.5 percent have just three years of schooling. The deficit in public schooling is a result not only of the war but also of political priorities. Poitevín and Pape (2003: 94) point out that education has not been a priority for any government during recent decades because it was unimportant (or even counterproductive) for the agro-export economy, which is based on cheap labor. Currently, young people between the ages of 15 and 29 constitute 38 percent of the economically active popula- give more than half their wages to the families they live with; at the same time, wages are the prime source of income for only 36 percent of youths, while 56 percent depend on transfers from parents or spouses and are thus in a situation of economic dependency.
In both countries we can observe that achieving economic independence is difficult due to a combination of the negative consequences of war for education and the lack of a political focus on youth-related issues after war termination. So how do young people cope? Can violence be a way to perform the status passage to economic independence? The argument in different debates on youth and violence is twofold:
a) violence provides opportunities for personal and/or collective enrichment and b) a large number of unemployed ("idle") young men lower the opportunity costs for armed actors because they are easy prey.
These assumptions stand at the core of the "youth bulge" hypothesis, which portrays young men as the perpetrators of violence and a security risk and represents part of the discussion on gangs. 19 In the case of Guatemala crime seems to play a smaller role for youth than politicians and media assume. The only quantitative study on gangs finds that 57 percent of Guatemala's gang members work in the noncriminal economy and 45 percent support their families financially. On the other hand, they supplement low incomes with criminal activities like theft and drug dealing (Demoscopía 2007: 47-60) . In Cambodia gangs are a means of social mobility and survival too. 20 While gangs there are increasingly seen as a problem, their violence is less lethal than in Guatemala.
In both contexts difficult transitions into economic independence seem to trigger youth participation in crime, but they do not explain variations in the level of violence. The following section on youth political citizenship and participation presents some of the factors that explain these differences.
Political Citizenship and Participation
Patterns of political citizenship, political participation and civic engagement are highly de- (Jarstad and Sisk 2008) . This has important implications for transitions into adulthood, as young people acquire a set of rights (for example, the right to vote and to be elected) and formal equality with their elders. As the political sphere continues to be dominated by adults, the existing patterns of young people's integration or exclusion can be an important factor in tension (or even violence).
In terms of their political regimes, Cambodia and Guatemala demonstrated quite different developments during and after the wars. 22 the results show some interesting similarities (see Table 1 This low degree of political participation is reflected in the political parties as well as at the local level, where youths rarely participate in the development councils. On the other hand, Cambodian youths exhibit a relatively high level of trust in the national government, and the authoritarian leadership of the Cambodian regime remains rather uncontested. However, Cambodian youth seem to be ready to contest age-based hierarchies, at least in the immediate social environment at the local and private level. This could lead to increasing intergenerational conflicts in the future. This short summary shows that at the formal level youth political participation is limited in both countries. Nevertheless, the new opportunities provided by -at least formal -democratization could offer possibilities for change if youth were to organize around youth-specific issues and agendas. Interestingly, the quest for political citizenship or political participation has not featured very prominently on the agendas of politicians and researchers in both countries. While transitions into adult society are difficult in both countries, violence plays some role in the transition to economic independence but does not have a political youth agenda. 23 The next section turns to the specific patterns and levels of youth interaction with adult society, identifying similarities and differences. to Guatemala its levels of violence are low (Hensengerth 2008a; UNODC 2011) . Despite these differences in extent, youth violence in both countries shows some interesting similarities: 24 -It is an urban phenomenon: in both countries the capitals (Guatemala City and Phnom Penh) are the main centers of youth violence, but frontier cities or regions are also important (Battambang in Cambodia, Petén in Guatemala) in relation to legal and illegal migration as well as the drug trade.
-The structural context is shaped by exclusion and marginalization.
-The organizational form is that of gangs, which provide youth with a feeling of belonging and solidarity as well as identity; youth gangs are a rather new phenomenon in Cambodia but have a longer history in Guatemala (Gender and Development for Cambodia 2003; Levenson-Estrada 1998 ).
-Alcohol and drugs are related closely to acts of violence. 25 Between the two countries, however, youth violence and gangs differ significantly in terms of their relationship with society. In Guatemala neither the state nor civil society has prioritized youth-specific problems such as education and unemployment. At the same time, youths do not seem to be able to articulate their discontent via political channels; they are mostly apolitical due to their experience that political engagement is dangerous and is responded to with repression. High levels of abstention are common in Guatemala (FUNDAJU 2011). In contrast, the Cambodian government offers marginalized youth the possibility of social mobility if they belong to the CPP-dominated patron-client networks. While these networks provide opportunities, they are also a means of controlling and functionalizing youth.
The so-called Pagoda Boys -a youth association affiliated with the CPP -illustrate this. In 2003 they were responsible for the violent looting of the Thai embassy; later they served as government thugs against the opposition during election campaigns (Hensengerth 2008b) . 26 The differences between Guatemalan and Cambodian youth violence are not just a question of scale (high in Guatemala, low in Cambodia) but also of the specific structure of violence. Most of Cambodia's youth violence is embedded within adult-controlled networks that enable traditional forms of (dependent) political participation. Hence the question is how we can explain these differences. Two factors seem to be important: the patterns of war termination and the forms of social control, both of which shape the postwar orders in different ways. Patterns of war termination are an important indicator of existing formal power relations, while patterns of social control provide hints as to the informal power relations.
Patterns of War Termination
Until 1989 military victories were the most frequent pattern of war termination. Since then the number of negotiated war terminations has increased significantly (Kreutz 2010 ). This has important implications for postwar societies. The argument for peace agreements is that they help to end war-related violence and save human lives. At the same time, the resulting orders are shaped by divergent (sometimes contradictory) political, social and economic agendas. The related fragility has even provoked calls to "give war a chance" (Luttwak 1999 ).
Despite some similarities -for example, the presence of the United Nations -in the two cases, power relations in the political and military spheres differed significantly between Guatemala and Cambodia after the wars ended.
In Guatemala the army was ousted from the core state institutions due to the democratization process and the peace accords but remained an important veto player (Kurtenbach 2008b; Schirmer 1998) . As a consequence, important provisions of the peace accords were not implemented and the neoliberal economic model -which deprived most young people of pathways to adulthood -increased existing social inequalities (PNUD 2010) . At the same time, the increasing number of homicides allowed for the survival of authoritarian prerogatives and populist politics (Pearce 2010) . Hence there are important differences in the stability of the postwar orders in Guatemala and Cambodia. In Cambodia a stable -though authoritarian -order has emerged around the patronage networks of the CPP and Hun Sen, while in Guatemala power struggles between very different actors remain largely unresolved despite (or due to) the formally democratic political system. An analysis of the levels of postwar violence supports this finding: in Guatemala levels of violence increased after the failed referendum in 1999, while levels of violence and crime decreased in Cambodia after 1998 (Kurtenbach and Hensengerth 2010: 28) .
Patterns of Reconstruction
The form of war termination influences not only the capacities of formal state institutions to control violence but also the reconstruction, reform or establishment of the broader set of secondary socialization institutions (neighborhoods, communities, religious organizations).
In Cambodia after the Vietnamese invasion the CPP began the reconstruction of social relations around the local Pagoda system, which is still important for social relations at the local as well as at the national level (Hensengerth 2008a) . Although the Pagoda system was emptied of its religious content, it provides important resources for day-to-day survival and youth integration (Kent 2006) . Men between the ages of 16 and 18 have the opportunity to study and serve the community for a year as an important pathway to adulthood. At the national level, Buddhism, the king and the royal family have provided a framework for social integration and national unity beyond the CPP. Despite these changes, socialization and status passages for youth in the overwhelmingly rural spaces of Cambodia have followed traditional patterns and expectations. GIGA Working Papers 199/2012 Differently from the case in Cambodia, institutions of secondary socialization, status passages and traditional patterns of social control have changed profoundly in Guatemala. First of all, Catholicism has lost its religious monopoly due to the increasing influence of Protestant sects from the United States, which emphasize extreme forms of individualism and thus undermine existing forms of social control and solidarity (Gros 1999; LeBot 1999) .
Secondly, patterns of social control differ between indigenous and nonindigenous communities. Although the indigenous Western Highlands were the main theater of war during the 1980s, the experience of repression was an important driver for the resurgence or rather the establishment of a common Mayan or indigenous identity. 27 The Guatemalan state did not make any significant effort to reconstruct society beyond the militarization of the rural areas. and hierarchical patronage systems that enable important status passages into adulthood.
While there have been changes, the main patterns have survived (at least until now). In Guatemala, to the contrary, young people are mostly disregarded by state and society. The situation appears to differ between indigenous and nonindigenous youth, but this important topic still has to be investigated. 28 In the following section the focus is on the relevance of these differences to the variations in the level of violence.
State, Society and Youth Violence
Although levels of direct physical violence differ significantly in Cambodia and Guatemala, in both countries marginalized and poor youth are perceived as the main perpetrators of violence (Hensengerth 2008b; Kurtenbach 2008c; Peetz 2010) . The specific features of postwar 27 Guatemala's indigenous population consists mostly of Mayan descendants, who are divided into 24 language groups, plus numerically small groups of Xinca and Garífuna. See Carmack (1988) , CEH (1999), Kurtenbach (2008b) . While the former seems to be feasible in rural contexts with relatively low levels of social differentiation, the latter is a product of rapid social change and urbanization. The spatial concentration of youth violence in the urban centers and at the frontiers supports this view.
Whereas youth violence can be controlled (and instrumentalized) by elders in the first pattern, it is more autonomous and peer-group based (for example, gangs) in the second. These different patterns mirror the broader relationship between youth and adult society. While the reconstruction of traditional patterns of power and social cohesion seems to provide an important basis for the integration and control of young people, youth-society relations become difficult where this does not occur.
The broader relationship between youth and adult society might thus be a much more important explanatory factor for the variation in youth violence than the mere existence of risk factors at the individual and collective levels. Experiences in other postwar societies seem to support this perspective. Nicaragua, for example, is a deviant case in Central America. Although it too is mostly discussed from the gang perspective, 30 the relationship between youth and society is quite different there. Government and state institutions such as the police have pursued inclusive, rather than mainly repressive, policies (Rocha 2008) . South Africa, on the other hand, is an example of a country where youth-society relations have been strained in the postwar context, thus leading to a high level of youth violence (Marks 2001) . Comparing Burundi and Rwanda, Sommers and Uvin observe significant differences in the societal responses to the problem of performing traditional status passages into adulthood. In both countries the most important prerequisite for marriage is to build a house, something which is made difficult by high levels of unemployment and a lack of access to resources. Yet while Burundian society interprets existing norms in a rather flexible way, Rwanda's government policies on housing aggravate young people's problems. Although (at least until now) this has not led to mounting levels of violence, it is an important cause of young people's frustration about their future prospects (Sommers and Uvin 2011; Sommers 2012; Uvin 2009 ).
While the examples provided in this paper offer only preliminary evidence, they illus- 
